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Redzisz: United States v. Davis - 648 F.3D 84 (2d Cir. 2011)

UNITED STATES V. DAVIS

648 F.3D 84 (2D CIR. 2011)

I. INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Davis, Sharyl R. Davis appealed the

forfeiture of a Camille Pissarro painting she had owned for over
twenty years, titled Le March6,' to the United States government.2
The government sought forfeiture of Le March6 pursuant to 19
U.S.C. § 1595a, which calls for the seizure and forfeiture of items
that are introduced into the United States "contrary to law," if they
are "stolen, smuggled, or clandestinely imported or introduced."'
On appeal, Davis primarily argued that the district court erred by
refusing to apply the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000
(CAFRA) to the government's forfeiture claim.' Davis also
argued that the district court erred by denying her motion for
attorney's fees after two of the government's three forfeiture
claims were dismissed at summary judgment.
The Court of

1. Camille Pissarro, Le Marchi ("The Market"), available at
http://www.camille-pissarro.org/Le-Marche.html.
Pissarro was a Nineteenth
Century Impressionist painter known for depicting scenes of French life.
Camille Pissarro Biography, CAMILLE PISSARRO: THE COMPLETED WORKS,
http://www.camille-pissarro.org/biography.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2011).
2. United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2011).
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(C)(1)(A) (2006).
4. Davis, 648 F.3d at 92; see also 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2006) (CAFRA offers
some protections to forfeiture defendants by raising the government's burden of
proof and by contemplating an innocent owner defense).
5. Davis, 648 F.3d at 97-98.
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Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
judgment concluding that forfeiture was appropriate, as well as its
order denying Davis attorney's fees.6
II. BACKGROUND

Le March6 was stolen from the Mus6e Faure, a museum located
in Aix-les-Bains, France, in 1981.7 The painting later resurfaced in
Texas, where Emil Guelton consigned it to J. Adelman Antiques
and Art Gallery.' In 1985, the gallery sold Le March6 for $8,500
to a corporation that was partially controlled by Davis. 9 Davis
eventually took personal ownership of Le March6 and displayed it
in her home for years before consigning it to Sotheby's for
auction.o French authorities became aware of the auction and
informed the United States that Le March6 had been stolen from
the Musde Faure more than twenty years earlier." The United
States Department of Homeland Security became involved, and
asked Sotheby's to withdraw the painting from auction.12
French authorities reopened their investigation into the theft and
questioned Guelton, who admitted to selling Le March6 to the
Texas gallery." A museum guard who was on duty the day Le
March6 was stolen also identified Guelton as the thief.14 With
Guelton's admission and the guard's identification, the United
6. Id. at 98.
7. Id. at 87. A second piece, the Renoir oil painting Buste de Femme, was
also stolen from the museum that day. Kate Taylor, Treasured PissarroPrint
Turns Into Costly Headache, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2011, at C1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/arts/design/buyer-of-stolen-pissarro-worksuffers-hefty-loss.html? r-3&hpw. A Japanese collector purchased the painting
from Sotheby's in 1987 for $154,000. Sotheby's is apparently looking into the
matter. Id.
8. Davis, 648 F. 3d at 87.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Davis, 648 F.3d at 87. The guard had seen Guelton leave the museum
with something hidden under his coat moments before she realized the painting
was gone. Id.
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States government filed a complaint in the Southern District of
New York seeking civil forfeiture of Le March6."
Ill. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS

At the district court level, the government alleged three bases for
forfeiture. 6 First, the government sought forfeiture pursuant to §
1595a, which is a customs statute that was enacted as part of the
Tariff Act of 1930." Section 1595a authorizes the forfeiture of
"merchandise which is introduced . . . into the United States
contrary to law ... if [the merchandise] ... is stolen, smuggled, or

clandestinely imported or introduced."" To satisfy the "contrary
to law" requirement of the statute, the government alleged a
violation of the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA).
The
NSPA criminalizes the possession or sale of stolen goods valued at
$5,000 or more that have moved in interstate or foreign commerce,
with knowledge that the goods were stolen.20 To fulfill the
statute's "is stolen, smuggled, or clandestinely imported or
introduced" requirement, the government alleged that Guelton
took Le March6 without permission from the Musbe Faure.2' The
government's second and third forfeiture claims were based on 18
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id. at 88.
Id.
19 U.S.C. § 1595a(C)(1)(A).
Davis, 648 F.3d at 88.
18 U.S.C. § 2314 provides:
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or
foreign commerce any goods .

.

. of the value of $5,000 or

more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted, or
taken by fraud . . . [s]hall be fined . .. or imprisoned not more

than ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2315 provides:
[w]hoever receives, posses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or
disposes of any goods . . . $5,000 or more . . . which have

crossed a State or United States boundary after being stolen,
unlawfully converted, or taken, knowing the same to have
been stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken . . . [s]hall be

fined ... or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
21. Davis, 648 F.3d at 88.
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U.S.C. § 981.22

Under § 981, property that is "derived from

proceeds traceable to a violation of . . . any offense constituting

'specified unlawful activity' is forfeitable to the United States."23
To support its § 981 claims, the government asserted that Le
March6 constituted the proceeds of Guelton's theft.24
The government moved for summary judgment on its § 1595a
claim, and Davis filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on all
three of the government's forfeiture claims. 25 Davis asserted that
because she was the "innocent owner" of Le March6, she was
entitled to keep the painting. 26 To support her defense, Davis
pointed to CAFRA, which states that "[a]n innocent owner's
interest in property shall not be forfeited under any civil forfeiture
statute." 27 The district court concluded that the forfeiture action
brought pursuant to § 1595a was not subject to CAFRA, and thus
not subject to an innocent-owner defense.28 The court also
determined that the government made a showing of probable cause
for forfeiture based on the museum guard's eyewitness testimony
and Guelton's admissions.2 9 Because the government met its
initial burden, the burden then shifted to Davis to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that Le March6 was not stolen
merchandise introduced into the United States contrary to law. 0
However, the district court awarded Davis summary judgment on
the government's forfeiture claims brought under § 981, finding
that CAFRA's innocent-owner defense applied to those claims.3
A jury trial was held to resolve the remaining issues of material
fact: whether Davis could demonstrate that Le March6 was not

22. Id.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (2006).
24. Davis, 648 F.3d at 88.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d).
28. Davis, 648 F.3d at 88.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(3)(A) (stating that an "innocent owner"
means "a person who, at the time that person acquired the interest in the
property ... was a bona fide purchaser for value ... and did not know and was
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture").
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transported in interstate or foreign commerce with knowledge that
it was stolen.32 The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of
the government. 3 The jury found that Davis failed to prove (1)
that Le March6 was not the work of art stolen from the museum,
(2) that Le March6 was not transported in interstate or foreign
commerce by Guelton, and (3) that Guelton did not "receive,
possess, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of' Le March6 with
knowledge that it was stolen after it crossed a United States
border.3 4
The district court entered a final judgment in favor of the
government concluding that forfeiture of the painting was
appropriate, and denied Davis's motion for attorney's fees."
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

On appeal, Davis argued that the government failed to
demonstrate probable cause to believe that Le March6 was subject
to forfeiture under § 1595a, and that "she was entitled to additional
substantive and procedural protections that the district court found
inapplicable to forfeiture actions brought pursuant" to § 1595a.36
The court also briefly addressed Davis's constitutional challenges
to the forfeiture of Le March6, as well Davis's request for
attorney's fees.
A. Section 1595a and the National Stolen Property Act
Section 1595a authorizes the forfeiture of merchandise
"introduced into the United States 'contrary to law,' if that
property 'is stolen, smuggled, or clandestinely imported or

32. Davis, 648 F.3d at 88.
33. Id. The guard's testimony that she saw Guelton leaving the museum on
the day of the theft with something hidden under his coat was crucial. Id.
Evidence also showed without question that Guelton transported the painting to
the United States, where he consigned it to the gallery. Id.
34. Id. at 88-89.
35. Id. at 89.
36. Id. This refers to CAFRA's protections.
37. Id.
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introduced."" On appeal, the government again alleged that
Guelton violated the NSPA by stealing Le March6, transporting it
into the United States, and consigning it to the Adelman gallery, in
order to satisfy § 1595a's "contrary to law" requirement." On
appeal, Davis argued that the district court erred three times in its
application of the NSPA to her case.4 0 Davis argued that: (1)
"contrary to law" referred only to violations of customs laws, not
to violations of the NSPA; (2) summary judgment should not have
been granted to the government regarding Le March6's value when
it entered the United States; and (3) Le March6 was no longer
stolen property within the meaning of § 1595a(c) when the
government sought forfeiture, and was therefore not subject to
forfeiture.4'
1.

The Meaning of "Contrary to Law"

Under § 1595a(c), property is only subject to forfeiture if it is
introduced into the United States "contrary to law."42 Davis
argued for a narrow reading of the statute's language, and asked
the court to interpret "'contrary to law" as "contrary to customs
law."43 The court, however, chose to read the statute literally,
stating that "' [i]t is axiomatic that the plain meaning of a statute
It determined that the phrase
controls its interpretation."'"
"contrary to law" should be interpreted broadly to mean "'illegal;
unlawful; conflicting with established law,"' and that nothing in
the statute's text limited a broad definition of the term "law." 45 If
Congress had intended to limit the scope of the definition of "law"
to "customs law," the court reasoned, it would have done so

38. 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A).
39. Davis, 648 F.3d at 89.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 89; see also § 1595a(c)(1)(A) (stating that "[t]he merchandise shall
be seized and forfeited if it ... is stolen, smuggled, or clandestinely imported or
introduced").
42. Davis, 648 F.3d at 89.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting Lee v. Bankers Trust Co., 166 F.3d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1999).
45. Id.
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explicitly.4 6 Therefore, a violation of the NSPA, as alleged by the
government, sufficed to meet the "contrary to law" requirement of

§ 1595a. 7
2.

The Value ofLe Marchi

To find a violation of the NSPA, the object in question must be
valued at a minimum of $5,000 at the time it enters the United
States.48 Davis argued that the court erred by granting summary
judgment for the government on this issue.4 9
The Second Circuit concluded that the district court properly
granted summary judgment in favor of the government because the
evidence presented by Davis failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact regarding Le March6's value." The court explained
that the fact that Le March6 sold for $8,500, or "seventy percent
above the statutory minimum" shortly after its importation into the
United States was strong evidence that it was worth at least $5,000
at the time Guelton brought it into the country." Though Davis
attempted to challenge Le March6's value through the use of
expert witnesses, the court determined that her witnesses did not
actually shed any light on the painting's value. Because Davis
46. Id.
47. Id. at 90. The court elaborated, stating "there is a strong argument that . .
'contrary to law' . . . means exactly what it says: the government may seize

and forfeit merchandise that is introduced into the United States illegally,
unlawfully, or in a manner conflicting with established law, regardless or
whether the law violated relates to customs enforcement." Id.
48. Davis, 648 F.3d at 90.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 90-91. When deposed, expert appraiser Alex Rosenberg asserted
that Le March6's $8,500 price tag was not low enough to trigger the suspicion
that it was stolen. Davis, 648 F.3d at 91. The court determined that this
assertion did nothing to prove that Le Marche was worth less than $5,000 when
it entered the country, but in fact suggested that it was sold for its fair market
value or less in 1985. Id. Art expert Gilbert Edelson was also deposed, and
stated that the vast majority of prints sold in the United States are sold for less
than $5,000. Id. However, he was silent as to Le March6's value specifically,
and the court determined that his statements also failed to combat the
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was not able to present
worth less than $5,000 at
States, the court held that
at at least $5,000 at the
proper.s"
3.

evidence proving that Le March6 was
the time it was imported into the United
summary judgment valuing that painting
time of its entry into the country was

The Meaning of "Is Stolen"

Pursuant to § 1595a, property "shall be seized and forfeited if it
is stolen, smuggled, or clandestinely imported or introduced" into
the United States.54 Davis argued that the phrase "is stolen"
required the court to determine whether the painting was stolen
property at the time of forfeiture, rather than at the time of its entry
into the country. The court rejected Davis's argument, finding
instead that the "text of [the] statute makes clear that 'is stolen'
refers to the status of the property at the time of its introduction
into the United States."" The court stated that, because § 1595a is
a customs statute "aimed at regulating the flow of goods into and
out of the country," it is concemed only with the status of goods as
they enter the United States, "not with what happens to them after
they get here."" The court concluded that Davis's interpretation of
the word "is" and the time period to which it refers would "[shift]
the statute's focus away from the border in a manner that would
produce absurd results."

government's evidence that Le March6 met the $5,000 threshold when it entered
the country. Id.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. 19 U.S.C. 1595a(c)(1)(A).
55. Davis, 648 F.3d at 91 (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 92.
58. Id.
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The Effect of the Civil Asset ForfeitureReform Act of 2000 on

§ 1595a
Davis claimed that CAFRA's protections were applicable to the
government's forfeiture action brought under § 1595a." However,
CAFRA expressly excludes forfeiture actions brought pursuant to
Title 19 from the benefit of its protections in what is known as its
"customs carve-out."6 0 Davis essentially argued that because the
underlying law applied to the forfeiture claim was the NSPA, a
Title 18 statute, CAFRA's protections should apply.' The court
concluded that CAFRA was inapplicable.62
CAFRA was enacted as Congress's response to concerns
regarding the "broad scope of the government's civil forfeiture
authority."
The court suggested that civil forfeiture claimants
"are rarely afforded the same protections that are applicable in
criminal forfeiture proceedings" because "[c]ivil in rem forfeiture
proceedings are based in part on the 'legal fiction' that '[i]t is the
property which is proceeded against, and . . . held guilty and

condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and
insentient."'64 CAFRA provides some claimants with a more
favorable burden of proof and an innocent-owner defense, among
other things." The court reviewed Davis's question of statutory
interpretation de novo.6" The court determined that CAFRA's
protections, namely its innocent-owner defense and its more
favorable burden of proof, did not apply to the government's §
1595a forfeiture action."

59. Id. at 92.
These protections include CAFRA's owner-friendly
preponderance of the evidence burden of proof and its innocent owner defense.
18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)-(d).
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(i)(2)(A) (excluding the Tariff Act of 1930 or any
law codified in title 19).
61. Davis, 648 F.3d at 92.
62. Id. at 95.
63. Id. at 92.
64. Id. at 92 (quoting Various Items of Pers. Prop. v. United States, 282 U.S.
577, 581 (1931)).
65. Id. at 92-93.
66. Id. at 93.
67. Davis, 648 F.3d at 95-96.
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Innocent-Owner Defense

The court concluded that Davis's argument that government's
forfeiture claim was subject to CAFRA's innocent-owner defense
was without merit." Section 1595a does not provide for an
innocent-owner defense in itself, and CAFRA "expressly excludes
forfeiture actions brought under Title 19 from its innocent owner
provisions."6 9
According to the court, § 1595a was enacted with a clear intent
on the part of Congress to "require forfeiture of property
To bolster that
regardless of the owner's culpability." 0
determination, the court pointed to a case decided by the Supreme
Court shortly after the adoption of § 1595a as part of the Tariff Act
of 1930; the case states in part that "forfeiture may be enforced
even against innocent owners.

. .

. The penalty is at times a hard

one, but it is imposed by the statute in terms too clear to be
misread."" The court also pointed to the fact that no reference to
an innocent-owner defense was ever incorporated into § 1595a,
despite subsequent amendments to the statute.72 The court stated
"' [g]iven Congress's recent attention to civil forfeiture, 'there is no
reason to believe that the omission

. .

.

was anything but

deliberate."' 7 3
Nevertheless, Davis urged the court to apply CAFRA's
innocent-owner defense.74 CAFRA's innocent-owner provision
applies to "any civil forfeiture statute," which is defined to include
"any provision of Federal law providing for the forfeiture of
property other than as a sentence imposed upon conviction of a

68. Id. at 95.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 93.
71. Id. (quoting Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S.
49, 57 (1932)).
72. Id.
73. Davis, 648 F.3d at 93-94 (quoting United States v. An Antique Platter of
Gold, 184 F. 3d 131, 138-139 (2d Cir. 1999)).
74. Id. at 94; see 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (stating in relevant part, "[a]n
innocent owner's interest in property shall not be forfeited under any civil
forfeiture statute").
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criminal offense."7 '
However, CAFRA excludes from that
definition "the Tariff Act of 1930 or any other provision of law
codified in title 19."76 According to the court, "that language could
not be more clear: for purposes of CAFRA, the Tariff Act of 1930
and the statutory provisions contained in Title 19-including
Section 1595a-are not 'civil forfeiture statutes.' 7 Because §
1595a is not a civil forfeiture statute as defined by CAFRA,
forfeiture actions brought pursuant to § 1595a are not subject to
CAFRA's innocent-owner defense."
2.

Burden ofProof

Davis argued that the district court erred by applying the burden
of proof standard found in 19 U.S.C. § 1615 to her case, rather
than CAFRA's owner-friendly favorable burden of proof." The
burden-of-proof provision of 19 U.S.C. § 1615" governs forfeiture
actions brought pursuant to § 1595a, as required by 19 U.S.C. §
1600." In this case, United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement officers seized Le March6 while acting under §
1595a, a customs statute.82 The court determined that because §
1595a does not specify its own burden of proof standard, the
75. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 983(i)(2)(A). This provision of the statute is known as the
"customs carve-out." Davis, 648 F.3d at 94.
77. Davis, 648 F.3d at 94.
78. Id. at 95. The court elaborated, stating "[i]gnoring the customs carve-out
would violate our obligation to follow the law rather than make it." Id. at 94-95.
79. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 983(c) (stating "the burden of proof is on the
Government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property
is subject to forfeiture," and that "if the Government's theory of forfeiture is that
the property . . . was involved in the commission of a criminal offense, the

Government shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the
property and the offense").
80. Section 1615 requires the government show that there is probable cause
to subject the property to forfeiture. 19 U.S.C. § 1615.
81. Davis, 648 F.3d at 96; see 19 U.S.C. § 1600 (stating "the procedures set
forth in Sections 1602 through 1619 of this title shall apply to seizures of any
property effected by customs officers under any law enforced or administered
by the Customs Service unless such law specifies different procedures").
82. Davis, 648 F.3d at 96.
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The court
burden of proof established in § 1615 applies.
explained that because it previously held that § 1595a was not a
civil forfeiture statute as defined by CAFRA, CAFRA's
heightened burden of proof was inapplicable.84 The court held that
the district court was correct to apply the pre-CAFRA burdenshifting approach of§ 1615 to Davis's case.15
C.

The Constitutionalityof the Forfeiture

Davis argued that forfeiture of Le March6 violated the Excessive
Fines clause of the Eight Amendment as well as the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.8 6 The court concluded that the
forfeiture did not violate either clause.
1.

The Excessive Fines Clause

The Eighth Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed."" The court defined a fine
as 'a payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense. "'89
According to that definition, only punitive forfeitures can be
considered a fine pursuant to the Eighth Amendment.90 The court
determined that the forfeiture of Le March6 was remedial rather
than punitive for two reasons: first, the government's customs
claim was not connected to any criminal prosecution; and second,
the forfeiture proceeding was brought under a customs law, which
"weighs strongly in favor of characterizing the forfeiture as
remedial." 9' Because the forfeiture of Le March6 was remedial,
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. 96-97.
88. Davis, 648 F.3d at 96 (citing U.S. CONsT. amend. Vill).
89. Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 265 (1989)).
90. Id. (citing Von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2007)).
91. Id. at 96-97; see also Platterof Gold, 184 F.3d at 139-40 (finding that the
forfeiture of an antique gold platter that was misdeclared upon entry into the

United States did not violate the Excessive Fines clause of the Eighth
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the court concluded that Davis's claim under the Excessive Fines
Clause failed.92
2.

The Takings Clause

The court ruled that Davis's argument that she was entitled to
compensation for the forfeiture of Le March6 under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment also failed.93 Although the Fifth
Amendment states that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law,"94 the court acknowledged
that the "Supreme Court has made clear that '[t]he government
may not be required to compensate an owner for property which it
has already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental
authority."' 95 Thus, the court determined that if the government
acts pursuant to a forfeiture statute, "'it may seize personal

property without compensating the owner."' 96 The court held that,
because the government acted pursuant to the forfeiture provision,
it was entitled to seize Le March6 without compensating Davis. 97
D. Attorney's Fees Under 28 U.S. C. § 2465(b) (1)(A)
Though a prevailing litigant is usually not entitled to collect
attorney's fees, CAFRA authorizes the courts to provide fees and
other costs to claimants who "'substantially prevail' in a 'civil
proceeding to forfeit property.""' Davis argued that her success in
Amendment because: (1) the forfeiture was not part of a criminal prosecution;
and (2) the forfeiture was brought pursuant to a non-punitive customs statute).
92. Davis, 648 F.3d at 97.
93. Id.
94. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
95. Davis, 648 F.3d at 97 (quoting Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452
(1996)).
96. Id. (quoting Redford v. U.S. Dep't of Treas., 691 F.2d 471, 473 (10th
Cir. 1982)).
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A)(2006)). Section 2465(b)(1)(A)
states "in any civil proceeding to forfeit property under any provision of Federal
law in which the claimant substantially prevails, the United States shall be liable
for . .. reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred by
the claimant."
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winning summary judgment on two of the government's three
forfeiture claims made her a prevailing party, and thus that the
district court erred in denying her attorney's fees."
The court determined that Davis did not substantially prevail
solely because she defeated two of the government's forfeiture
claims.o The court reasoned that Davis's partial victory only
"narrowed the issues presented in [the] case," and did not "entitle
her to retain ownership of Le March6.""' The court further
reasoned that Davis did not "substantially prevail" because she did
not obtain any of the relief she sought; Davis's aim was to retain
title to Le March6, but the result of the litigation was that title
vested in the United States.10 2 Therefore, the court concluded,
Davis did not "substantially prevail" within the meaning of §
2465(b)(1)(A) and was not entitled to attorney's fees."
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
As a case involving art theft, Davis is somewhat unusual. Many
of the published opinions associated with stolen art focus on works
that were taken from Jewish Europeans by Nazis during World
War II." Davis is unique in that the theft of Le March6 took place
relatively recently, and the painting's return was pursued by a
government, rather than by the painting's original owner.'05
Despite legislative intent to protect owners of forfeitable property
through CAFRA, the government's forfeiture authority is still
broad. Some consider the government's forfeiture power to be
problematic on its face, particularly because it deprives citizens of
99. Id.
100. Davis, 648 F.3d at 97.
101. Id. at 98.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See generally Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The Choice Between Civil &
Criminal Remedies in Stolen Art Litigation, 38 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1199
(2005).
105. This is not to suggest that forfeiture of artwork does not occur. Rather,
the lack of published case law in this area may be because owners of property
that is subject to forfeiture would prefer to relinquish the property than to
litigate against the government, with its seemingly unlimited resources.
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private property in a country that places great value on property
rights.o6 Moreover, CAFRA's customs carve-out makes it even
easier for the government to seize property by imposing only a low
burden of proof on the government and by refusing to allow for an
innocent owner defense. It is unclear whether the customs carveout is a way for the government's forfeiture power to go
unchecked, or whether it is a legitimate and reasonable way for the
United States to protect its borders.
When a work of art becomes the focus of a customs-based
forfeiture proceeding, as in Davis, there is some discrepancy as to
the burden of proof the government must satisfy in order to
successfully seize the work. In Davis, the government relied on
the NSPA, a criminal statute, to satisfy the "contrary to law"
requirement of § 1595a, a civil forfeiture statute. On its own, the
NSPA contains a scienter requirement: the government must
prove that someoneo' knew the item in question was stolen,
converted, or taken by fraud.0 " Because the NSPA is a criminal
statute, it is logical to assume that the government must satisfy the
criminal burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt to
successfully prove knowledge under the NSPA. However, should
that still be the case when the NSPA is used in conjunction with a
forfeiture claim, under which the highest burden of proof the
government is ever required to meet is a preponderance of the
106. See Chip Mellor, Civil Forfeiture Laws & the Continued Assault on
Private Property,
FORBES.COM
(June
8,
2011
5:30
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2011/06/08/property-civil-forfeiture.html.
See also
Barclay Thomas Johnson, Restoring Civility-The Civil Asset ForfeitureReform
Act of 2000: Baby Steps Towards a More Civilized Civil ForfeitureSystem, 35
Ind. L. Rev. 1045 (2002).
107. As evidenced by Davis, that "someone" does not have to be the person
who ultimately ends up with possession of the property. Under the NSPA,
knowledge applies to "[w]hoever transports, transmits, or transfers" the stolen
property in interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 2314. As the court
concluded, whether Davis knew Le March6 was stolen was irrelevant; it was the
thief who was responsible for transporting the painting into the United States,
and it was his knowledge that was crucial. Davis, 648 F.3d at 92.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (stating "[w]hoever transports, transmits, or transfers
in interstate commerce any goods, wares, merchandise . . . of the value of

$5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted, or taken by
fraud") (emphasis added).
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evidence?l0 9 Some case law suggests that the answer should be
yes."0 The Davis court placed particular emphasis on Guelton's
responsibility for transporting Le March6 into the United because,
as the thief, he clearly knew that Le March6 was stolen, and his
knowledge easily satisfied the NSPA's scienter requirement.
Though knowledge was readily provable in Davis, the U.S.
government has also initiated art forfeiture proceedings in which it
did not allege that anyone ever knew that the property was
stolen."' For example, in March of 2010 the government returned
an ancient Egyptian sarcophagus to Egypt after it was intercepted
by a customs official at Miami International Airport in October of
2008.12 The sarcophagus was not accompanied by any paperwork
109. In a forfeiture claim brought pursuant to § 1595a, the government's
burden of proof is low; it is only required to show that there is probable cause to
subject the property to forfeiture. 19 U.S.C. § 1615. When CAFRA's
protections apply, the government's burden of proof is raised; it must establish
that the property is subject to forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence. 18
U.S.C. 983(C).
110. See e.g. United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). In Portraitof Wally, the government sought forfeiture of a
painting taken from an Austrian gallery owner by Nazis during World War 11.
After a series of transactions, the painting ended up at an Austrian museum, and
was imported into the United States on loan to the Museum of Modem Art in
New York. Id. at 238-46. The government sought forfeiture under § 1595a,
and, as in Davis, satisfied the statute's contrary to law requirement by alleging
that the painting was imported into the United States in violation of the NSPA.
Id. at 250. The court remanded the case to determine whether the art dealer who
acquired the painting and eventually sold it to the Austrian museum knew that it
was stolen when he agreed to import it into the United States. Id. at 276.
111. See e.g. Jennifer Mann, Government Sues to Seize St. Louis Museum's
Mummy

Mask,

STLTODAY.COM

(Mar,

17,

2011,

12:05

AM)

http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/article_98d72244-9976-5b8a-a73d5c211c6a771b.html. The government is seeking forfeiture of the museum's
3,200 year-old mummy mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, which the museum purchased
in 1998 for almost $500,000. Id. The government claims that the mask was
stolen from Egypt, and the museum claims that it thoroughly researched the
mask before purchasing it (it contacted INTERPOL and consulted the Art Loss
Register), and considers itself to be the mask's rightful owner.
112. David Gill, Egyptian Sarcophagus Returned, LOOTING MATTERS (Mar.

13, 2010, 9:34 PM) http://lootingmatters.blogspot.com/2010/03/egyptiansarcophagus-returned.html. See also David Gill, Miami Law: Missing the
Point?,

LOOTING

MATTERS
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(Mar.

18,

2010,

10:12

PM)
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that could document how and when it left Egypt." In order to
seize the sarcophagus as imported stolen property, the government
alleged violations of Egyptian export laws, as opposed to
violations of a statute like the NSPA, to satisfy § 1595a's
"contrary to law" requirement.'" The implication derived from the
sarcophagus case is that the government does not even have to
allege violations of United States law to successfully seize
property. The ability to draw on the domestic laws of foreign
countries could allow the government's forfeiture power to extend
even further than it already does when CAFRA's protections do
not apply. As a result, it is possible that more innocent owners
would be deprived of property due to potential hesitancy to defend
against uncertain foreign law, especially when the government's
burden of proof is so low.
CAFRA's customs carve-out is also problematic when viewed in
light of scholarly suggestions that even CAFRA's heightened
burden of proof is still not high enough to offer real protection to
innocent owners.'
Barclay Thomas Johnson suggests that an
even higher standard of proof should be imposed on the
government because of the "punitive and quasi-criminal nature" of
civil forfeitures." 6 Thomas suggests that the burden of proof
http://lootingmatters.blogspot.com/2010/03/miami-and-coffin.html.
The
sarcophagus was purchased from a Spanish antiquities dealer by a United States
citizen and imported into the United States via Ireland. Id. The sarcophagus
was reportedly already sold to a Canadian collector when it was intercepted. Id.
113. Looting Matters: Why has a Coffin Been Returned to Egypt?, PR
NEWSWIRE (Mar. 19, 2010) http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/lootingmatters-why-has-a-coffin-been-retumed-to-egypt-88563512.html.
114. Gill, supra note 112. Because no paperwork could be produce to
establish any credible provenance for the sarcophagus, it was considered owned
by Egypt pursuant to its Cultural Patrimony Laws. Id. Thus, the sarcophagus
became stolen property when it was exported from Egypt without permission
and in violation of its export laws. Id. See also United States v. One Ancient
Egyptian, Yellow Background, Wooden Sarcophagus, Dating to the Third
Intermediate Period, 09-23030 CIV (S.D. Fla., filed Oct. 8, 2009) (on file with
author). For a discussion on Egypt's Cultural Patrimony Laws, see United
States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003).
115. Johnson, supra note 106, at 1075-79.
116. Id. at 1076. Ultimately, the government is alleging that a crime has
been committed. Id.
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placed on the government under CAFRA should be raised from
preponderance of the evidence to a showing of clear and
convincing evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture,
because "there is significant reason to believe that there is an
unacceptable risk of error that exists that innocent parties will be
deprived of property, and that raising the burden would mitigate
[that] risk.""'
If the government's burden of proof is still too low when
CAFRA's protections apply, what does that say about the
government's even lower burden in forfeiture proceedings that are
not subject to CAFRA because of its customs carve-out? On one
hand, the government may be wholly justified in seeking to protect
its borders stringently, especially considering that forfeiture is
aimed primarily at controlling the flow of narcotics in the United
States."' On the other hand, civil forfeiture is also a way for the
government to generate revenue," 9 which calls into question its
real motivations for pursuing forfeiture.' 20 Is forfeiture in danger
of being used improperly and "become[ing] more like a roulette
wheel employed to raise revenue from innocent but hapless owners
whose property is unforeseeably misused . .. than a component of

a system of justice?" 2'
Despite the "caveat emptor"'22 implications of Davis, it seems
unlikely that the case will have much effect on the art market or

117. Id. at 1076-78. Some states have enacted legislation that requires the
government to satisfy a higher burden of proof than preponderance of the
evidence. Id. at 1076.
118. See generally Johnson,supra note 106.
119. In 2008 the U.S. Department of Justice's Asset Forfeiture Fund
contained more than one billion dollars in forfeited assets. Mellor, supra note
106. In 2008 it was reported that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives "had ordered Leatherman multi-tools inscribed with the letters
ATF-'Asset Forfeiture' and 'Always Think Forfeiture."' Id.
120. Johnson, supra note 106, at 1069-70. While revenue was not a factor in
Davis, the United States' return of Le March6 to France may have fostered
goodwill between the two countries. Perhaps there is some political advantage
to be gained from actively pursuing the forfeiture of art and antiquities that enter
the United States from other countries.
121. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 456 (Thomas, J., concurring).
122. Commonly translated to mean "Let the buyer beware."
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art-based litigation. Art theft does not show signs of slowing,12 3
and a work's provenance is often incomplete and difficult to
ascertain.'24 It seems that the most an art collector can do to avoid
future litigation is to purchase works that have a solid provenance,
and to consult the various systems that are designed to report and
track stolen art, such as the Art Loss Register,'25 the National

123. See Charlotte Burns, Art Thefts on the Rise Across North America, THE
NEWSPAPER
(Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/
articles/Art-thefts-on-the-rise-across-North-America/24420. The FBI estimates
that international art crime is worth more than six billion dollars annually. Id.
Art crime headlines were particularly prominent in the United States during the
summer of 2011. See Richard Perez-Pena, Sommelier Stole Art Openly, Police
Say,
N.Y.
TIMES,
July
15,
2011,
A17,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/nyregion/theft-of-picasso-by-nj-man-wasdirect-police-say.html.
124. Provenance is "an art historical term referring to the history of the
ownership of a particular work of art." PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL
HERITAGE, AND THE LAW 298 (2d ed. 2008).
"In an ideal situation, the
provenance can be traced back to the artist," but that is not always possible,
especially when the work is very old. Id. Though museums and reputable
auction houses like Sotheby's regularly engage in provenance research, the
same may not be true with smaller galleries and dealers. See id. at 298-99.
Moreover, the art world is relatively secretive, especially where large sums of
money are concerned; owners and purchasers often prefer to remain anonymous,
as can be seen in the provenance information provided in almost any auction
catalogue.
See
e.g.
Upcoming
Auctions,
CHRISTIES.COM,
http://www.christies.com/calendar/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
Davis
contacted a Pissarro expert to authenticate Le March6 before she purchased it
from the Adelman gallery, but there is no evidence that anyone attempted to
establish where Le Marche came from or whether Guelton held valid title to the
painting. Taylor, supra note 7. Le March6 was estimated to be worth $60,000
to $80,000 when it appeared in Sotheby's catalog. Id.
125. The Art Loss Register allows anyone to electronically register a lost or
stolen item, to register a possession, and to conduct research to determine if an
item is lost or stolen. THE ART Loss REGISTER, http://www.artloss.com (last
visited Nov. 20, 2011). However, even certification from the Art Loss Register
that an object has not been reported stolen may prove ineffective, especially
where antiquities are concerned. See David Gill, Art Loss Register &
Antiquities,
LOOTING
MATTERS
(July
14,
2010,
9:51
PM),
http://lootingmatters.blogspot.com/2010/07/art-loss-register-andantiquities.html.
ART
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Stolen Art File (NSAF),1 2 6 and Interpol's international database of
stolen works.12 7 However, provenance can be fabricated and stolen
works can go unreported. The decision to buy art is driven largely
by emotion rather than logic; the legal risks buyers face will be
outweighed by the passion they feel for the works they purchase.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in
The court found that forfeiture of Le March6 was
full. 128
appropriate and could not be precluded by an innocent-owner
defense.129 The court also found that the forfeiture was not
unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines clause of the Eighth
Amendment or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'"
Finally, the court found that Davis was not entitled to attorney's
fees. "'
Izabella Redzisz*

126. Developed by the FBI, the NSAF is a computerized index containing
images and physical descriptions of stolen objects, as reported to the FBI by law
enforcement agencies all over the United States and abroad. NATIONAL STOLEN
ART FILE (NSAF), www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/vc majorthefts/arttheft/
national-stolen-art-file (last visited Nov. 20, 2011). An object must meet certain
criteria to be added to the NSAF index: it must be uniquely identifiable, have
historical or artistic significance, and be worth at least $2,000. Id.
127. Internet access to the database is now available. Press Release,
INTERPOL, INTERPOL creates online access to global stolen works of art
database to reduce illicit trade (Aug. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.interpol.int/public/ICPO/PressReleases/PR2009/PR200978.asp. For
a list of provenance Web sites, see JESSICA L. DARRABY, 1 ART, ARTIFACT,
ARCHITECTURE AND MUSEUM LAW § 2:58 (2010).
128. Davis, 648 F.3d at 98.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
* J.D. Candidate 2013, DePaul University College of Law; B.A. 2009,
College of Wooster. I would like to thank Professor Patty Gerstenblith for her
valuable time and advice.
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